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Abstract
A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive
trade-o¤. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with lit-
tle uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There
is an ongoing debate in the literature about the rst trade-o¤. Due
to lack of data, there has so far been hardly any empirical evidence
about the second. Making use of a unique representative data set, we
nd clear evidence that risk aversion has a highly signicant and sub-
stantial negative impact on the probability that an employees pay is
performance contingent.
Key Words: Agency theory, GSOEP, Incentives, Pay for perfor-
mance, Performance appraisal, Risk, Risk aversion
JEL Classication: J33, M52, D80
Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), SFB-TR 15 (Gov-
ernance and the e¢ ciency of economic systems), is gratefully acknowledged.
yRWTH Aachen University, Templergraben 59, 52056 Aachen, Germany, tel: +49 241
8096381, e-mail: christian.grund@wiwi.rwth-aachen.de
zUniversity of Cologne, Herbert-Lewin-Str. 2, 50931 Köln, Germany, tel: +49 221
470-5888, fax: +49 221 470-5078, e-mail: dirk.sliwka@uni-koeln.de.
1
1 Introduction
There is an ongoing debate on the empirical test of predictions made by
agency models. A key area of investigation has been the importance of risk
considerations for incentive contracting. Prendergast (1999) for instance
surveys the empirical literature and concludes that while agents do appear
to respond to incentives, it would not appear that on the margin, the risk
measures that have been considered are the true constraining factors on the
provision of incentives.
The focus of the empirical investigations has been the predicted negative
trade-o¤ between measures of uncertainty and pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity (Allen and Lueck (1992), Lafontaine (1992), Aggarwal and Samwick
(1999), Ackerberg and Botticini (2002), Hilt (2006), Wulf (forthcoming)).
As discussed for instance by Prendergast (2002) the evidence on this is weak
or even seems to contradict predictions from standard moral hazard models.
But an important variable governing the trade-o¤ between risk and in-
centives that has not been directly addressed with eld data is the agents
risk aversion.1 This is due to the fact that it seeems hardly measurable in
many contexts. Allen and Lueck (1995) for instance state that since indi-
vidual risk preferences are not measurable, the predictions [from risk sharing
models] using preference parameters are never testable or Chiappori and
Salanié (2003) stress that although risk aversion plays a crucial role in the
story, it is not directly observable.
We use a unique dataset to investigate the connection between indivdi-
ual risk aversion and the incidence of performance pay. The 21st-wave of
the German Socioeconomic Panel, a representative survey of the people liv-
ing in Germany, o¤ers this unique possibility for two reasons. First of all,
this wave of the panel for the rst time contains information on whether an
employees performance is evaluated and wages are performance contingent.
In addition, this wave contains a novel set of questions measuring an indi-
viduals risk attitudes. Dohmen et al. (2005) have validated this measure
experimentally by showing that the measure is a good predictor of actual
1Up to now there have been some attempts to control for risk aversion indirectly in
empirical studies by using proxies like wealth and assuming that risk aversion is decreasing
in wealth (see e.g. La¤ont and Matoussi (1995)). Recently, Dohmen and Falk (2006) found
experimental evidence that risk averse agents self select into xed pay contracts rather
than into tournaments.
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risk-taking behavior in lottery choice experiments.
In our dataset we cannot observe the direct pay-for-performance sensi-
tivity in the employment contracts. But we observe a dichotomous variable
indicating whether or not an employee receives performance contingent wage
payments. A key problem an employer faces when deciding on whether to
use performance contingent wages is that performance measurement will
typically be costly and he therefore has to trade-o¤ the costs of performance
appraisal against the benets. Therefore we rst built a very simple model
in which a principal can decide on whether to install a costly performance
appraisal system as a precondition to introduce performance pay. As the
benets of performance pay decrease when the agent is more risk averse, we
show that the probability of o¤ering a xed wage should increase when the
agent is more risk averse.
Our empirical study strongly conrms this prediction based on standard
agency theoretical considerations. We nd a not only highly signicant but
also economically substantial negative e¤ect of an employees risk aversion
on the probability that his wage is peformance contingent. Hence, individual
risk attitudes indeed do seem to be an important constraining factor on the
provision of incentives.
2 A Simple Model
We consider a very simple Holmström/Milgrom-type model. A risk neutral
principal employs an agent. The agent is risk averse with a coe¢ cient of
absolute risk aversion r. He chooses an e¤ort level e at costs C (e) where
C 00 (e) > 0. Following Holmström and Milgrom (1991) we assume that the
agent enjoys exerting e¤ort up to a certain level e > 0 such that C 0 (e) = 0.
The principal can measure the agents output when he installs a system
for performance appraisal at costs k. When she has done so, the agents
output s = e + " becomes veriable, where " is some normally distributed
random noise component with variance 2". The agents reservation wage
is wa. When the principal installs the appraisal system the compensation
contract of the agent is given by  + s. Without an appraisal system she
can only pay a xed wage.
When no appraisal system is installed the agent exerts his intrinsically
pre¤ered e¤ort level e. As the participation constraint is binding the prin-
3
cipal pays a wage wa + C (e) and earns expected prots
e  wa   C (e) :
When an appraisal system is installed the agents certainty equivalent is
+e C (e)  12r2"2. Taking the agents binding participation constraint
and the incentive constraint  = C 0 (e) into account, the principal maximizes
her prots
max
e
e  wa   C (e)  1
2
r2"
 
C 0 (e)
2   k.
Taking the rst derivative with respect to e and replacing C 0 (e) with ,
we obtain the standard characterization of the optimal pay-for-performance
sensitivity
 =
1
1 + r2C 00 (e)
> 0: (1)
Hence, the agents optimal e¤ort level e characterized by  = C 0 (e)
exceeds his intrinsically favoured level e.
The principal will therefore implement an appraisal system whenever
e   wa   C (e)  1
2
r2"
 
C 0 (e)
2   k  e  wa   C (e) :
For k = 0 the condition always holds. When k is very large it can never
hold. Note that k  e C (e) e+C (e) constitutes an upper boundary on
the principals returns from using performance pay. For k > k the principal
will stick to xed wages irrespective of the agents risk aversion. When
0 < k < k, the principals decision on whether to appraise the agents
performace depends on r. For r = 0 the principal will always measure the
agents performance and for r ! 1 she will never do so. Applying the
envelope theorem it can directly be derived that the left hand side is strictly
decreasing in r. Hence, we can conclude:
Proposition 1 When k  k the principal always o¤ers a pure xed wage.
When 0 < k < k there is a cut-o¤ value for the agents coe¢ cient of ab-
solute risk aversion r such that his performance is measured and his pay is
performance contingent if and only if r is smaller than this cut-o¤.
In this simple agency model a rm negotiates a compensation package
with a given agent and those negotiations lead to xed wages when the
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agent is very risk averse and to performance pay when this is not the case
and performance measurement is not too costly. But of course there is also
a matching and selection issue. Note that the rms prots are strictly
decreasing in the agents risk aversion when performance is measured. How-
ever, when it is not measured, prots do not depend on the agents risk
attitudes at all. Hence, when a position has to be lled where performance
can be measured rather easiliy such that k < k the rm will hire agents with
a low degree of risk aversion. But for positions where performance measure-
ment is very costly such that k  k; the rm does not care at all about
r.2 Hence, we should still observe that the probability that an employee
receives performance contingent wages is decreasing in the degree of his risk
aversion.
Here the matching issue rea¢ rms the predictions obtained from the
analysis of contracting in a xed principal-agent relationship. In contrast,
when the connection between uncertainty and incentives is considered, match-
ing may lead to a reversal of predictions as for instance discussed by Acker-
berg and Botticini (2002), Li and Ueda (2005) or Serfes (2005).
3 Empirical Evidence
3.1 The Data
We make use of the German socio-economic panel (GSOEP), a large rep-
resentative survey of people living in Germany, which has been extensively
used for exploring various research questions before.3 The questionnaire has
been extended in the latest available (21st) wave (2004) with respect to two
very interesting aspects: First, people are asked whether their job perfor-
mance is regularly assessed by a superior as part of an agreed procedure and
if yes, whether this performance evaluation inuences their monthly gross
wage, yearly bonus, future salary increases and/or potential promotions.4
2Jullien et al. (forthcoming) analyse optimal screening when the principal does not
know the agents risk-aversion and show that the power of incentives decreases with risk-
aversion.
3See http://www.diw.de/english/sop/index.html for a detailed description of the data
set.
4We thank the GSOEP-Team from the German Institute of Economic Research (DIW,
Berlin), who followed our suggestion to incorporate these questions in the 2004 question-
naire.
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Second, this wave of the GSOEP contains a novel set of questions mea-
suring individual risk attitudes on an 11-point scale from 0 unwilling to take
risksto 10 fully prepared to take risks. Next to a general risk attitude
question, there is also information for di¤erent areas of life like e.g. the risk
attitude in the occupational career. Dohmen et al. (2005) have validated
this measure experimentally by showing that it is a good predictor for ac-
tual risk taking behaviour in lottery choice experiments. For the rst time,
it is therefore possible to analyze the link between individual risk aversion
and performance based pay with eld data.
The GSOEP contains information on performance evaluation and its
impact on monthly wages, bonuses, future wage increases and possible pro-
motions of about 7; 500 full and part-time working employees, which are not
older than 65 years (the regular retirement age). Performance is evaluated
regularly by a superior as part of an agreed procedure for 31 per cent of
these employees. One quarter of the employees, whose performance is ap-
praised systematically, a¢ rm an impact on the monthly wage, one third on
bonuses, 40 percent on future wage increases and a half on possible promo-
tions. Multiple answers were feasible. Two thirds of the individuals with
performance appraisals a¢ rm that the evaluation has at least one of these
consequences.
3.2 Results
On the 11-point scale, the average willingness to take risks in the area of
the occupational career di¤ers signicantly between individuals with (4:25,
sd = 2:44) and without (3:75, sd = 2:48) performance appraisals (T-test,
p < 0:001). This signicant di¤erence of the willingness to take risks be-
tween individuals without and with performance appraisals holds for the
whole distribution (see Figure 1, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p < 0:001). The
di¤erence is even larger compared to the subgroup of individuals with per-
formance appraisals, who report a monetary impact on their bonus (mean =
4:48; sd = 2:47). This and all further results do qualitatively hold also for
the general risk attitude variable. The bivariate correlation between both
risk attitude variables is high (0:59), but not perfect. The risk attitude of
individuals can therefore di¤er across areas of life.
We estimate a binary probit approach to investigate the e¤ect of an
individuals risk attitutes on the probability that his or her performance
6
00.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
without PA
with PA
with PA & impact on bonus
Figure 1: Cumulative distribution of the willingness to take risks
is appraised and that this appraisal has monetary consequences. As other
individual (sex, age, and years of schooling) and job based characteristics
(tenure, working hours, job status, rm size, industry and region) may in-
uence the probability of performance appraisals we control for them in our
analysis. We generated twelve industry dummies. Firm size categories are
also measured with a set of 6 dummy variables indicating the number of
employees. Job status covers 15 categories of blue collar and white collar
workers as well as civil servants with di¤erent job requirements and respon-
sibility levels. Tenure is stated in years.
Indeed, model (1) conrms a highly signicant positive relationship be-
tween the willingness to take risks and the fact that an employees perfor-
mance is appraised which is well in line with predictions based on agency
models. But as indicated above, the fact that the performance of an em-
ployee is appraised not necessarily implies that this appraisal has monetary
consequences. Hence, we estimated the impact of risk attitudes on the prob-
ability that an employees performance is appraised and this appraisal has
monetary consequences (i.e. on either monthly wages, bonus, future wage
increases or promotions) in model (2) which leads to the same observation.
The same is true if we only consider appraisals which a¤ect bonus payments
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Performance Appraisal & Appraisal & Appraisal &
appraisal monetary impact on no monetary
consequences bonus consequencesa
Risk attitudeb 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.013
(career risks) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
Female -0.136*** -0.232*** -0.257*** 0.066
(0.041) (0.048) (0.053) (0.065)
Age -0.004* -0.010*** -0.002 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of schooling -0.003 -0.007 0.014 0.007
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014)
Tenure -0.002 -0.000 0.001 0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Part time -0.115** -0.201*** -0.289*** -0.032
(0.048) (0.061) (0.072) (0.070)
East German 0.026 -0.123** -0.101* 0.200***
(0.040) (0.050) (0.054) (0.060)
Firm Size (Reference <5 employees):
5-19 0.307*** 0.351** 0.353** 0.069
(0.099) (0.149) (0.172) (0.135)
20-99 0.536*** 0.579*** 0.587*** 0.401***
(0.096) (0.145) (0.167) (0.126)
100-199 0.725*** 0.734*** 0.724*** 0.410***
(0.102) (0.150) (0.173) (0.140)
200-1999 0.970*** 1.014*** 0.941*** 0.599***
(0.094) (0.143) (0.164) (0.125)
2000 1.267*** 1.326*** 1.142*** 0.781***
(0.094) (0.142) (0.164) (0.126)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Job status dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 7598 7073 7413 5680
Pseudo R2 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.06
Log likelihood -4080.71 -2806.91 -2212.00 -1462.89
Binary Probit Estimations, robust standard errors in parentheses.
* signicant at 10%; ** signicant at 5%; *** signicant at 1%.
a Individuals whose appraisals have monetary consequences are omitted in model (4).
b 11-point scale from 0 unwilling to take risksto 10 fully prepared to take risks.
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in model (3).5
However, it may still be possible that risk averse people dislike being
monitored in general and therefore it is less likely that their performance is
evaluated even when such an appraisal has no direct monetary consequences.
To test this, we construct a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when an
individuals performance is appraised but this appraisal has no monetary
consequences. Comparing this group of employees with individuals without
any form of performance appraisal (model 4), no signicant e¤ect of the
risk attitude can be observed. Hence, performance evaluation has to have
economic consequences in order to be associated to individual risk attitudes.
These results do also hold for subgroups of employees with respect to gender,
working hours and job status.
But it is of course important to estimate not only the statistical but
also the economic signicance of the observed e¤ect. To do this, we use
the probit results to compare the estimated probabilities for performance
appraisals at di¤erent quantiles of the distribution of risk attitudes. We
nd that a person at the 75th percentile of the willingness to take risks
has a 16 per cent higher chance that his performance is appraised than his
counterpart at the 25th percentile. Looking at the impact on the probability
of receiving bonus payments, this relative inter-quartile range is even 27 per
cent.6 Hence, the e¤ect is also substantial in economic terms. Our results
therefore strongly support the risk-incentive trade-o¤ suggested by agency
models.
The results with respect to the control variables indicate that men rather
than women and full-time rather than part-time workers have jobs with
performance appraisals. Furthermore, we nd that performance is evaluated
more often in larger rms. But years of schooling and tenure do not matter.
The performance of older employees is slightly less often evaluated. This
age e¤ect becomes much stronger when we do not control for risk attitutes
which is due to a positive e¤ect of age on risk aversion.
5The reference group in model (2) are all individuals without appraisals or whose ap-
praisals have no monetary consequences and in model (3) all individuals without appraisals
and those where appraisals have no impact on bonus payments. Analogous estimations
using the impact on monthly wages, future wage increases and promotions conrm this
result. The sample size is decreasing in these specications, because not every individual
has responded to these questions.
6These results are computed at the mean of all other independent variables in model
(1) and (3) respectively.
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4 Conclusion
Making use of a new and unique data set, we analyze the link between
performance pay and employeesrisk attitudes. Therefore, it is possible for
the rst time to explore the risk aversion-incentive trade-o¤ suggested by
agency theory with eld data. We nd clear evidence that the indidvidual
risk aversion of an employee has a signicantly negative and substantial
impact on the probability that his performance is evaluated and that he
receives performance contingent wages.
An important task for further research is to explore the triangular inter-
relation between individualsrisk aversion, uncertainty of the environment,
and incentive contracts simultaneously. The di¢ culty is of course to obtain
measures of individual employees risk preferences at the same time as mea-
sures of uncertainty in the performance signals used by their employers. But
the growing availability of matched employer-employee datasets gives some
hope that this may become possible in the near future.
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